Human Factors Applied to Perioperative Process Improvement by Keebler, Joseph R. et al.
Publications 
3-2018 
Human Factors Applied to Perioperative Process Improvement 
Joseph R. Keebler 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, keeblerj@erau.edu 
Elizabeth H. Lazzara 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, lazzarae@erau.edu 
Elizabeth Blickensderfer 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, blick488@erau.edu 
Thomas D. Looke 
Florida Hospital 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication 
 Part of the Human Factors Psychology Commons, and the Perioperative, Operating Room and Surgical 
Nursing Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Keebler, J. R., Lazzara, E. H., Blickensderfer, E., & Looke, T. D. (2018). Human Factors Applied to 
Perioperative Process Improvement. Anesthesiology Clinics, 36(1). https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.anclin.2017.10.005 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact 
commons@erau.edu. 
Human Factors Applied to
Perioperative Process
Improvement
Joseph R. Keebler, PhDa,*, Elizabeth H. Lazzara, PhDa,
Elizabeth Blickensderfer, PhDa, Thomas D. Looke, PhD, MDb,c,d,1
OVERVIEW OF HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS
Human factors and ergonomics (HF/E) is a multidisciplinary scientific field that lies at
the cross-section of engineering, psychology, safety, and design.1 HF/E focuses on
the relationship between humans and technology at work and attempts to make these
human-machine systems safe, reliable, and enjoyable. To accomplish these goals,
HF/E considers the design of tasks, equipment, the operational environment, and
the training and selection of personnel. Although there has been HF/E work in medi-
cine for decades, only recently has HF/E begun to be integrated on a wide scale
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KEY POINTS
 Human factors/ergonomics (HF/E) is its own scientific discipline that can be applied to
understanding performance in perioperative medicine.
 Humans are not perfect decision makers and are affected by a variety of factors that can
greatly harm their ability to perform, including attention, bias, stress, and fatigue.
 HF/E has a unique perspective on human error, and HF/E can illustrate how moving away
from blame can enhance safety.
 HF/E offers strategies for undertaking a systematic approach to assessment of work pro-
cesses in perioperative medicine that can be used to increase safety and wellbeing of pa-
tients and providers.
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into the medical domain. After reports by the Institute of Medicine2 and more recently
by Makary and Daniel3 highlighting the danger of medical errors and the numerous pa-
tient deaths resulting from them, it is pertinent that medical systems’ safety is
improved. Therefore, this article focuses on the application of HF/E to the medical
domain and, more specifically, the perioperative environment. Some of the major the-
ories of HF/E and how they can be applied to understanding the medical work environ-
ment are highlighted. The aim is to provide a grounded discussion of the HF/E science
within this context and demonstrate the way it can be leveraged to make the periop-
erative environment as safe as possible. Within each section is detailed a major
component of HF/E, and examples are provided from the perioperative environment
where appropriate. Finally, suggested remedial strategies based on the various as-
pects of HF/E discussed are summarized.
HUMAN COGNITION AND PERFORMANCE
To understand work systems, how human beings think and act must be understood.
One of the core theories behind how human cognition functions— in other words, how
individuals perceive, attend to, and evaluate information from the world — is called in-
formation processing.4 Information processing theory (Fig. 1) breaks human cognitive
capabilities into its constituent parts. These include understanding attentional capac-
ity, perceptual limitations, working and long-term memory storage and recall, and
decision-making mechanisms.
Referring to Fig. 1, energy from the world — be it light (vision), sound waves (hear-
ing), or pressure (feeling) — enters the various sensory organs and creates a signal.
Next, the energy is processed through attentional mechanisms. Attention is the pro-
cess of controlling — either consciously or unconsciously — the limited sensory
mechanisms to focus on important information and ignore irrelevant or unimportant in-
formation.5 This information then enters perception, which is the interpretation of en-
ergy from the world into a meaningful whole and is limited by the filters of attentional
mechanisms. Memory refers to 2 systems — working memory, which is the active
cognitive mechanisms, in which information is temporarily stored for use in the near
future, and long-termmemory, which is a repository for the majority of important mem-
ories across the life span. Finally, there is decision making, which consists of choosing
and executing a plan of action based on the attenuated perceptual process and pre-
vious experiences.
Human cognition functions by using 2 parallel yet distinct systems for processing
information— a perceptually driven system, usually referred to as bottom-up process-
ing, and an expertise-driven and memory-driven system referred to as top-down pro-
cessing.6 These 2 systems work in tandem to lead to conscious experience of the
world, yet both are error prone and problematic in certain circumstances. Bottom-
up processing uses direct information from the world and is error prone when that in-
formation is incomplete — such as when individuals are experiencing high workload,
have difficult decisions with multiple potential outcomes, or lack knowledge about a
particular situation. Top-down processing uses memory and sums of knowledge to
make educated guesses about the world. It relies on experience to make judgments
Fig. 1. Basic model of information processing in human cognition.
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that can sometimes override direct experiences. As an example, imagine a provider
hearing an alarm for the first time that alerts the provider to changes in a patient’s
health status. This normally would instantly grab attention and is an example of the
bottom-up mechanism of cognition. But imagine a situation where the alarm is con-
stant — or is one that beeps regularly on a machine a provider has been using for
years. Instead, the provider will likely ignore it, having become accustomed to the
noise always present.
The information processing model is important to consider in the perioperative envi-
ronment because it explains numerous issues arising from the cognitive work of med-
ical professionals. Medical providers are inundated with large amounts of information
and must make complex and snap decisions in a work environment full of noise and
distractions. Two examples of how information processing can be involved in acci-
dents and the issues that can arise from information processing failures and how
they relate to the perioperative environment are highlighted.
Selective Attention
Many failures in human performance are related to attention. Specifically, selective
attention can undermine the ability to make decisions correctly under moments of
high workload or pressure. For instance, a majority of car accidents and incidents
involving controlled flight into terrain are arguably caused by selective attention limita-
tions.1 In health care, providers are inundated with information from electronic medical
records (EMRs), colleagues, and monitors as well as alarms, overhead announce-
ments, and a multitude of information from other sources. Therefore, providers are al-
ways actively selecting what is important to attend to within their work environment.
This has important implications for errors. Can providers be blamed for failures in
attention when they are constantly bombarded by various signals from a multitude
of sources? Regardless of professional expertise, human beings do not function
well in this type of system due to selective attention. It is important for organizations
to recognize that all humans have these attentional limitations and to allow for work
design that remediates inundating individuals with too much information.
Prospective Memory
Often, providers rely on their memory to keep a to-do list for the work they have to
conduct throughout their day. Unfortunately, relying on this type of memory, often
termed, prospective memory — remembering to remember — can lead to errors in
performance. Prospective memory relies heavily on cues — for instance, delivering
a drug when a particular alarm sounds — or relies on time — giving a dose of a
drug every hour.7 Both of these processes can suffer heavily from interruptions or
off-task activity, leading to major failures in providers keeping to the list in their pro-
spective memory. A common way to counter prospective memory failures is using
checklists and other cognitive aids — physical artifacts that act as memory outside
of the head. Although little work has directly examined the effects of protocols or
checklists on prospective memory performance, much of the work on handovers
and transitions of care has found that use of checklists is an effective way to pass large
amounts of patient information quickly.8 Therefore, it makes sense that using these
types of tools would remediate the issues that arise from relying too heavily on pro-
spective memory mechanisms.
Decision Making and Bias
Humans can only understand the world through their limited perceptual mechanisms,
as described previously. Although it was previously thought that decisions were made
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by evaluating and weighing each potential option (ie, the normative model of decision
making),9 work by Tversky and Kahneman10 and decision making scientists over the
past 4 decades has instead demonstrated that human decisions are affected by a
plethora of biases. Biases are defined as errors in thinking that are based in the limited
ability to attend to and process information as well as previous experiences and judg-
ments of the world.
There are numerous biases that can affect work in the perioperative environment
(Table 1). Many are based in the inability to perceive all information in the world
concurrently. Instead, humans make decisions that are based on oversimplified
mental simulations of reality,11 sometimes called heuristics. Bounded rationality refers
to the state of thinking within the limitations of human perceptual capabilities. In other
words, humans attempt to be as rational as possible given limited knowledge, atten-
tion, and ability to understand the outcomes of complex decisions. Within the periop-
erative environment, it is important to consider this bounded rationality when
considering blame and the way individuals work. This idea that individuals — acting
as bounded rational thinkers — are attempting to do their best in an incomplete and
risky world is referred to as the local rationality principle. Individuals usually make de-
cisions to the best of their ability yet fail against their best interest.7 Table 1 describes
some of the most common biases that affect human decision making and offers
examples of how these biases may play out in the perioperative setting.
Bias has can be countered in a multitude of ways. Robbins12 lists some potential
remedies. These include staying targeted on goals; seeking information from multiple
sources, especially those that might counter values or beliefs; acknowledging and
avoiding the formation of causal relationships from random data; and increasing
options when making decisions.
STRESS AND WORKLOAD
The health care domain is rife with examples of humans working under high stakes
with conditions, such as time pressure, uncertainty, and complex technology; the peri-
operative environment is no different. Working under stressful conditions can generate
negative psychological and physiologic responses, which, in turn, can have both
short-term and long-term negative impacts on job performance as well as providers’
overall health and well-being.
Stress
The term, stress, is used in HF/E to describe the process by which external demands
(eg, time pressure, events, and noise) evoke a self-appraisal process in which
perceived demands exceed resources, resulting in undesirable physiologic, psycho-
logical, behavioral, or social outcomes.13 Fig. 2 portrays the relationship between level
of arousal induced by stressors and performance.1 As can be seen, the relationship is
an inverted U function. In situations of low arousal (in which the worker is not fully stim-
ulated and bored/not alert), performance tends to be poor. As stimulation increases to
a moderate level, performance also improves, until arousal has increased beyond a
certain degree, at which point performance begins to drop off.
Over the long term, stress-induced physiologic changes can damage health via ef-
fects on the nervous, cardiovascular, endocrine, and immune systems.14 In addition to
long-term decrements in physical health, more immediate impact occurs on job per-
formance,15 some of these via cognitive effects.16 Consequently, offering strategies to
reduce workplace stressors and/or help anesthesia providers maintain effective per-
formance when under stress is an important area for patient safety.
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Table 1
Examples of common forms of bias
Name of Bias Definition Example
Overconfidence bias Individuals are overconfident and optimistic
in their abilities.
An experienced anesthesiologist induces general anesthesia without
using a checklist and is unable to ventilate the patient because both
the CO2 scrubber and backup airway device are missing. The patient
becomes severely hypoxic by the time a replacement backup airway
device is found.
Anchoring bias Individuals attach to initial information and do not
update based on more recent information.
An obese patient’s oxygen saturation (sat) falls slowly to 90% during
robotic prostatectomy in steep Trendelenburg position. The
anesthetist, convinced that positioning is responsible, increases
positive end-expiratory pressure to 10 cm H2O and is encouraged that
the sat increases to 92%. The anesthetist is then relieved for lunch and
the relieving anesthetist replaces the finger pulse oximeter sensor with
one on the nose and finds the sat is 100%. At the end of surgery, the
finger pulse oximeter is found partially dislodged.
Confirmation bias Individuals selectively gather information that fits
their worldview and ignore or dismiss information
contrary to their world view.
An anesthetist requests to have the medication cart restocked between
cases and is assured it is done. Toward the end of the next surgery,
while the surgeons are finishing a laparoscopic procedure with the
main room lights off, the anesthetist draws up the paralytic reversal
drugs neostigmine and glycopyrrolate. A couple minutes after giving
the reversal, the patient becomes bradycardic and remains completely
paralyzed. The anesthetist then discovers that the glycopyrrolate bin
was accidentally restocked with similar size and color vials of
rocuronium (a paralytic drug).
Availability heuristic Individuals base their decisions on information that
is easily accessible instead of correct information.
An anesthesiologist routinely evaluates cardiac health by asking patients
if they can climb a couple flights of stairs without getting short of
breath. A healthy-appearing patient answers that he can climb stairs
without any problem. After inducing general anesthesia, the patient
becomes hypotensive and arrests. After successful resuscitation, a more
detailed review of the medical record reveals a recent cardiology
clearance note that says the patient is high risk with a severe
cardiomyopathy but is in optimal shape for surgery.
(continued on next page)
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Table 1
(continued )
Name of Bias Definition Example
Escalation of
commitment
Tendency to continue with a decision even when
it is clearly incorrect
A surgeon persists with robotic assisted laparoscopic surgery, even
though there is significant blood loss making it difficult to see what he
is doing. He says he is almost done and insists on continuing even after
being told that the patient is hypotensive and requiring blood
transfusion. He converts to an open approach only after the patient
arrests, at which time he discovers a laceration of a major blood vessel
requiring vascular surgery intervention.
Hindsight bias The tendency to believe the outcome of a decision
could be predicted after the outcome has
already occurred
During an open nephrectomy, a patient starts bleeding profusely and
arrests during the 20 min it takes to get blood in the room. The patient
is successfully resuscitated but later dies in an ICU. The anesthesiologist
blames himself for not insisting that the blood be available in the room
before the start of surgery.
Randomness error Ascribing causal meaning to random events An anesthesiologist refuses to offer spinal anesthesia to any patient
taking herbal supplements after having 1 such patient become
paralyzed from a spinal hematoma, even though it is known that
herbal supplements do not increase the risk after spinal anesthesia and
that this 1 patient probably had spinal arterial-venous malformations
responsible for the hematoma.
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Workload
Although stressors include environmental as well as psychosocial factors, a prominent
stressor is mental workload. The term, mental workload, relates the demands of the
task to the mental resources of the operator17 and is an area of HF/E that has a
long history of research.18 The feeling of having “too much to do in too little time” is
a simple example of overly high workload and, in turn, may indicate an individual is
vulnerable to performance decrements.
Assessing providers’ workload level is an important aspect of evaluating the effec-
tiveness of their workplaces, equipment, and procedures.19 An initial step to identifying
high workload situations is to conduct a timeline analysis.20 A timeline analysis is a task
analytical approach to determine overlap in tasks during any point in time.21 Although
task analytical inspections of this nature can indicate high workload exists, examining
task time schedules is only 1 aspect of understanding workload. An individual’s effec-
tiveness at time-sharing tasks can also be altered by factors, such as extensive expe-
rience performing the task and/or automaticity (as described previously) as well as
which particular mental resources a task demands (eg, visual vs auditory).1
A variety ofmore in-depth approaches tomeasuringworkload exist and have beenwell
tested in domains, such as aviation and, more recently, anesthesia. Workload measure-
mentapproaches include inspectionof thespeedandaccuracyof taskperformance,add-
ing a secondary task to assess availability of unused mental resources, and physiologic
measures (from circulatory, respiratory, central nervous [including visual], and endocrine
systems) as well as subjective workload ratings provided by the operators themselves.22
As an example of the effectiveness of this work, Weinger and colleagues21,23,24 have had
multiple successes using a variety of these techniques in the perioperative setting.
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Performance assessment, the systematic collection of information to diagnose perfor-
mance, is arguably the most substantial driver to enhancing the quality of health care
Fig. 2. A graphic representation of the Yerkes-Dodson law demonstrating the relationship
between level of arousal and performance during tasks. (Adapted from Wickens CD,
Gordon-Becker SE, Liu Y, et al. An introduction to human factors engineering, 2nd edition.
Upper Saddle River [NJ]: Pearson Prentice Hall; 2004; with permission.)
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and patient safety.25 It is used to determine the competence of clinical care providers, to
provide information tohealthcareconsumers, and for quality-improvement efforts.26Un-
derstanding performance and performance variations, which can only be ascertained
throughassessment, can serve as the scientific foundation for healthpolicy.27Ultimately,
performance and the subsequent findings from assessment have an impact on 3 distinct
groups: patients, clinicians, andemployers.28Understanding the impact on thesegroups
becomes complex when considering performance assessment within clinical practice.
The complexity inherentwithin performance assessment is due to the dynamic and inter-
dependent nature of health care29 and the individual variations within patients.30
Although performance assessment is invaluable for advancing quality care, it is not a
panacea andmust be developed and executed according to the science of learning and
psychometrics. According to these sciences, there are several considerations that need
to be addressed to maximize performance assessment. The first requirement is to
considermultiple levels ofmeasurement.31Performancecanbemeasuredat the individ-
ual, team, department, and even organizational levels. The appropriate level is deter-
mined by the knowledge, skills, or attitudes being trained and the type of feedback
and remediation necessary to improve performance. The second requirement is that
performance assessment should consider processes aswell as outcomes.32Outcomes
represent the end result, and they identify the presence of problems. They alone, how-
ever, do not provide any insights into how those outcomes were accomplished, the
cause of the result, and what strategies are necessary to achieve a different outcome.
Patient outcomes are often cited as the cornerstone of performance measurement25
but focusing exclusively on such outcomes depicts an incomplete picture. Essentially,
it is unknown if theoutcomewas reached throughaccurateorerroneousprocesses.Pro-
cesses, on the other hand, are more descriptive and diagnostic and offer insights and
directions for how to address any behavioral changes. The third requirement is to use
multiple sources, techniques, and tools for assessing performance.33 To elaborate,
the source ofmeasurement refers to who is conducting the assessment (eg, supervisor,
peer, or learner); the techniquesand tools refer to thehowandwhat in regards todevices
andproceduresused toconductassessments (eg, surveys,observations,or interviews).
Multiple sources, techniques, and tools ensure a more robust and comprehensive un-
derstanding of performance. The only way to truly diagnose, deconstruct, and rectify
every element of performance is by leveraging an assessment program that heavily con-
siders the science behind psychometrics and learning.
One exemplar study of an operating room performance assessment program heavily
scrutinized the aforementioned requirements, conducting a team training intervention
and evaluation at a large southeastern community hospital. The assessment program
wasmultilevel and focused on processes and outcomes and includedmultiple sources,
techniques, and tools.34 Specifically, the research team used a multilevel assessment
that focused on trainee reactions, trainee knowledge, trainee on-the-job behaviors, and
organizational outcomes (eg, patient safety culture). Within this assessment, the pro-
cesses included team behaviors (ie, communication, leadership, mutual support, and
situation monitoring), and the outcomes were represented as patient safety culture.
To ensure that multiple sources andmeasurement tools were used, the team leveraged
surveys that participants completed as well as observations that members of the
research team performed.
SAFETY AND ACCIDENTS
Medicine is rapidly evolving, with a current paradigm shift regarding the way it con-
ceives of and reacts to errors. In the field of human factors, errors have been looked
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at as a systemic issue for decades. In other words, the field of HF/E has treated errors
as an inherent aspect of risky systems, instead of as solely the failures of individuals or
teams operating within the system. This differs greatly from traditional ideas of error in
which individuals are blamed for failures, a way of thinking that is outdated and coun-
terproductive in modern systems and organizations.
There are numerous possible reasons that blame has persisted as an aspect of error
management. For instance, blaming individuals means that those blaming are
assuming they can understand the cause of an error and prescribe only 1 source of
that error — the operator or, in this case, the provider involved in the case. As dis-
cussed, ascribing causation to random data is a common bias and is likely behind
much of the blame that exists in medicine. But as described previously, understanding
causation is skewed by views, experiences, memories, and biases. Blame also moves
away from uncovering the operational issues that can propagate and make an orga-
nization less safe. Most errors arise from couplings between humans, technology,
tasks, and the organizational context.20 Blaming individuals, then, is not only incorrect
but potentially counterproductive: punishing providers for committing errors leads to
an organizational culture where there is less of a chance of error reporting— an abso-
lutely integral aspect of high reliability organizations.35 Individuals who fear punitive
measures do their best to protect themselves in a system that punishes them.
Root cause analyses (RCAs) have become a common investigative method in hos-
pitals and medical systems. Usually RCAs use interviewing techniques after a medical
incident and use these data to discover causal factors leading to the mishap. Unfor-
tunately, even the name itself — root cause — is problematic. In almost all accidents
there are arguably multiple causes, and assuming there is 1 cause only delays the
uncovering of other causal factors. In recent years, RCAs have moved away from their
name toward a technique called all-cause analysis. Furthermore, research has called
for the integration of HF/E professionals into error investigations to ensure ergonomics
and cognitive aspects of work are considered in the management and investigation of
errors.36
SUMMARY
This article attempts to provide a high-level overview of the field of human factors in
relation to perioperative medicine. This is in no way a comprehensive view of the sci-
ence but it is hoped that enough insight is provided to give clinical teams ideas on
where they can start solving issues or changing policies to support safety and better
patient outcomes. To tie this information together, some investigators have developed
models to represent the multiple moving parts that need to be considered in modern-
day health care organizations. One example of this is the Systems Engineering Initia-
tive for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model.37 The SEIPS model is a representation of the
various organizational components — people, patients, tasks, technology, and orga-
nizational constraints — that in many ways summarize the entirety of applying HF/E
across the health care continuum. Table 2 presents examples of how these different
elements may interact to challenge performance in perioperative settings. Thinking
about how HF/E principles apply to safe perioperative care, 3 HF/E-informed guide-
lines for safety are offered.
Adopt Cognitive Aids and Checklists for Complex Tasks
The use of protocols and checklists has become widespread in medicine. These
cognitive aids can be key ingredients to supporting thinking and decision making
and should be instituted where a large amount of information is transmitted or
Human Factors Applied to Perioperative Process 25
recorded between providers. The more complex a patient case, the more useful these
types of tools can become. Although EMRs have been adopted to fill this role, they
come with a set of other problems that have made them difficult to adopt and use,
especially in the high-stakes and fast-paced environment of perioperative medicine.
Through research and design, cognitive aids can be introduced that work along pinch
points that cannot be fulfilled by EMRs alone.
Use Error Reporting Systems
Creation of both anonymous and nonanonymous error reporting systems can greatly
enhance organizational mindfulness. The use of both systems is important.
Table 2
Potential issues with human performance in perioperative settings
Issue Definition Example
Cognitive fixation Attachment to previous
judgments although new
information has arrived
that should change that
judgment
A provider mis-hears a
patient state that she
drinks 2 bottles of wine
per evening, when the
patient actually said 2
glasses. Further
diagnoses are based on
the assumption the
patient is alcoholic.
Plan continuation Adherence to a plan
although cues
demonstrate that it is not
working
A provider team moves
forward with a surgery
although the patient was
exhibiting some
comorbid symptoms that
could lead to a poor
surgical outcome.
Incomplete or incorrect
knowledge, skills, or
attitudes
Lack of knowledge, skills,
or attitudes pertinent to
finding a remedy for a
particular situation or
escalating error
The certified registered
nurse anesthetist had not
been part of a code blue
in more than 5 y and was
unsure of exactly what
steps to take next.
Novel technology Introduction of new tools
and technology without
appropriate training
leads to risks that were
not previously in the
system and also leads to
unexpected information
as the system reacts in
new and different ways.
The new EMR continually
led to delays due to
unexpected lockouts,
difficulty in finding
needed information, and
lack of a good user
interface.
Dynamic fault
management
The need to continue
attending to ongoing
information and tasks as
new tasks stack on top
due to system failures
A surgeon accidentally cuts
an artery during surgery
and needs to manage the
subsequent blood loss
while also attempting to
finish the surgical
procedure.
Adapted fromDekker S. Patient safety: a human factors approach. Boca Raton (FL): CRC Press; 2011;
with permission.
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Anonymous systems allow for individuals to report their concerns without having to
worry about repercussions or punitive actions. This is especially important for organi-
zations that are going through a cultural change, yet are still relying on the human error
model. The nonanonymous system allows for follow-up interviews to garner more in-
formation around a specific problem. Allowing individuals to have the option of both
creates a culture of understanding and keeps the organization on the path to high
reliability.
Enhance the Root Cause Analysis Process
Although RCAs are going through quite a bit of change, they can still fundamentally be
useful for understanding errors. Understanding that there are multiple causes is the
first step to increasing their effectiveness. Furthermore, integration of HF/E consul-
tants can aid hospitals in understanding potential systemic factors, including equip-
ment and technology failures, issues with team coupling, task complexity, or
organizational policy — all potential issues that might be missed by using the standard
RCA process.
Summary of Recommendations
Consider the cognitive limitations of health care providers and support staff within the
perioperative environment. Although they are experts, they still suffer from the same
limitations of any human working in a high-stakes, high-risk system. This needs to
be considered in the design of their work environment and procedures and appreci-
ated by organizational leadership. Where applicable, cognitive aids, checklists, and
so forth should be used to support the cognitive functioning of medical providers.
Understand that humans work within the confines of bounded rationality and that
most decisions are made on incomplete information. Organizations should provide
support through decisions aids, safety policies, and cognitive aids to support provider
thinking and reduce bias. Antibias training could also facilitate better decision making.
Understand that human error is usually not a satisfactory explanation for why med-
ical errors occur. Instead organizations need to adopt a policy that appreciates the
complexity of medicine and values that providers do not want to harm their patients.
Human operators (ie, providers) are at the sharp end of the system and usually stumble
on errors, not because they are incompetent but because the system is imperfect and
risky. Through utilization of error reporting systems and investigations that appreciate
systemic factors, medicine can learn about deeper rooted systemic factors and work
on fixing them rather than finding a scapegoat and leaving the problem in place.
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